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Empirical scholars in political science have generally al-
lowed normative theorists to conceptualize key concepts such
as democracy, accountability, and representation (Collier and
Adcock 1999; Pitkin 1967). For some empiricists, taking the
time to revisit the very concepts that they are purportedly
measuring and testing seems at best too philosophical, and
hence out of their domain (although see Goertz 2006 for a com-
prehensive treatment of social science concepts). Conse-
quently, the empirical literature on representation has focused
too heavily on statistical roll-call analyses, which to a certain
degree can help us ascertain the extent to which legislators
represent their constituents in legislatures and Congress. Sub-
stantive representation, however, involves much more than
how legislators vote. In order for political scientists to under-
stand why, we must think carefully about what representation
involves. This essay will examine the concept of representa-
tion by briefly considering what normative theorists such as
Jane Mansbridge and Hanna Pitkin have said about the sub-
ject, and then analyzing the concept of representation through
the lens of what more recent empirical researchers have said
about concepts, typologies, and case selection.
Normative Conceptions of Representation
Starting with Pitkin (1967), political scientists have re-
garded representation as either descriptive, substantive, or
symbolic. Descriptive representation refers to citizens being
represented by legislators who share particular demographic
characteristics (race, gender, or ethnicity), while substantive
representation involves legislators representing citizens’ in-
terests or particular preferences. Symbolic representation re-
fers to descriptive representation without the substantive com-
ponent. Scholars of black representation have debated the
merits of which type of representation is most effective, with
Swain (1993) arguing that substantive representation is what
really counts, while Mansbridge (2003) places more value on
descriptive representation. Mansbridge, however, is a norma-
tive theorist who has argued that descriptive representation is
essential for advancement of minorities and women in the
American political system. Pitkin’s analysis did not really deal
with minority representation, but the concept she presented
has been extended to such studies. To date, no work on racial
representation has challenged Pitkin’s conceptual framework
or analyzed the concept of representation using more recent
empirical research on methods.1
The Concept(s)
What does it mean to be represented?  What does it mean
to represent others? We are always asking others to represent
us either before a lawmaking body, a court, or other institution.
When one is represented by an attorney before a court, the
attorney acts in the material interests of her client. It does not
matter whether the attorney looks like her client physically.  As
long as the attorney defends her client well, then the client will
be satisfied. In terms of political representation, however,
surely more is at stake than just material interests. As Aristotle
observed long ago, political issues deal with how we ought to
order our lives together in the larger community. Additionally,
politics deals with how individuals will be treated, including
policies such as affirmative action, immigration, and English
Only laws, just to name a few. This distinction is crucial be-
cause when Pitkin talks about descriptive and substantive rep-
resentation, she is referring to political representation. As
Gerring explains, concepts are not static and “progress in the
cultural sciences occurs, if it occurs at all, through changing
terms and definitions” (Gerring 2001). This may seem like a
minor point because a normative political theorist is obviously
referring to political representation. When we are trying to
think clearly about concepts, though, it is important to con-
sider the ladder of abstraction in order to avoid conceptual
stretching and, at the other extreme, narrowing our concepts
to infinitesimal degrees. Additionally, issues of race and repre-
sentation have dramatically changed since Pitkin’s exegesis,
which requires conceptual revisions.
As Gerring points out, it matters how we define our terms
when we conduct empirical research. When researcher A speaks
about democracy, she may mean something completely differ-
ent than researcher B. While King, Keohane, and Verba (1994)
insist that researchers choose observable and thus testable
concepts, many of the most intriguing questions in the study
of politics involve seemingly unmeasurable concepts. One
cannot deny that the study of terrorism is appropriate for po-
litical scientists, yet understanding what motivates terrorists
is hardly a simple question since it defies many of the primary
motives for human behavior, such as utility maximization, and
self-preservation (KKV 1994). Instead of giving up on concep-
tualizing difficult concepts, it would be better to tackle some of
the most difficult substantive political problems and develop a
prove useful to scholars is another matter, and remains to be
seen (see Nome 2007).
Finally, a mea culpa. In the book, I appropriate the term
“nested analysis” (from Lieberman) for a style of single-out-
come analysis that employs large-N cross-case evidence.
Clearly, Lieberman has in mind both generalizing and particu-
larizing styles of case study when he uses the term. (I should
have chosen Coppedge’s term—nested induction—which is
consistent with what I had in mind.) One of the gratifications
of post-publication symposia is the opportunity to set the
record straight. Sorry, Evan!
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How should representation be conceptualized? The pre-
vious section offered a critique of the prevailing norms of
research regarding the issue of political representation. Given
the complexity of this concept, it is fitting to explore the many
different cells that comprise the “property space” of the con-
cept of representation.4 A typology is a device for “partition-
ing events into types that share specified combinations of
factors (Stinchcombe 1968).” In the context of representa-
tion, then, the table above would describe the different
typologies of representation. Typologies can be complex or
simple. Typologies for democracy can become quite complex,
while typologies for approval ratings for the President are
quite simple. In the area of representation, I am arguing that
the prevailing typology is too simple, and that we need to
further complicate this concept into a more encompassing
typology, much in the same way Elman (2005) has done for
the study of international politics. This must be done in order
to understand the meaning of representation in this demo-
cratic system.
Once the typological space is established, one can sys-
tematically rule out certain combinations that do not exist in
the real world. In the case of representation, I have only
sketched a possible typology above, in which all cells of the
rudimentary matrix exist in the real world. Of course, this ty-
pology is a simple one with few cells. For future research in
this area, as well as comparative work on democratic develop-
ment, it is important that theories using typologies look be-
yond hypotheses and examine all possible cases of a given
outcome.5
As discussed in the previous section, Ragin has offered
a framework that assesses the importance of typologies and
their implications. Ragin rightly points out that many research-
ers do not know where to proceed once their typology is
fleshed out. In the tradition started by Lazarsfeld’s property
space typology construction, Ragin sets forth his configura-
tional approach as the heir to Lazarsfeld. Through functional
reduction, it is argued, researchers can narrow the domain of
researchable cells. In the case of racial representation, it is
conceivable to imagine various scenarios of elected repre-
sentatives and their demographic characteristics, such as
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clear conceptual framework by which to proceed.
Ragin’s analysis of concepts stems from his belief that
cases should be seen as configurations. That is, all too often,
social scientists have viewed variables as independent of each
other. With regard to representation, scholars have dichoto-
mized representation by splitting the concept into descriptive
and substantive. Ragin would argue for a configuration where
these two concepts are placed in a spatial continuum in a way
that acknowledges the diversity, albeit limited, of the concept
of representation. As Ragin explains, membership in sets is
“often partial” and rarely do we find cases that are either in or
out of a given category (Ragin 1999). Ragin’s solution to this
dilemma is the use of “fuzzy sets,” an analytic tool aimed at
studying variation by degree without sacrificing differences in
kind. It is not at all clear that Ragin’s solution is the only one
available to social scientists interested in making sure that such
differences are accounted for in their research. More attention
to conceptualization using traditional methods can achieve the
same goal.2
In the area of representation, most empirical researchers
have chosen to use Pitkin’s dichotomy in order to test whether
given groups are being adequately represented. For the most
part, scholars in this research tradition have argued that sub-
stantive representation is what really matters, although many
scholars argue that there is intrinsic value in descriptive repre-
sentation based on issues of justice such that certain groups,
especially women, should have some parity in political institu-
tions (Young 1997). Is representation, though, either descrip-
tive or substantive? Are there not instances in which descrip-
tive representation is a necessary condition for substantive
representation? If so, how can we conceptualize this?
These questions have sparked my curiosity because it
seems to me that many of the arguments regarding which type
of representation matters deal more with conceptualization than
with how representation per se is measured. Hardly anyone
would disagree that descriptive representation without sub-
stantive representation is not worth very much. However, the
real question is whether those who represent districts with
different demographic characteristics can adequately represent
their constituents despite the physical difference. In this sense,
the scholarship on racial representation suffers because of a
lack of attention to the conceptualization of representation.3
Figure 1 shows interactions of types of representation,
and whether particular combinations yield high, mixed, or low
representation. Note that the difficult combinations are the
medium substantive representation cells. To some degree, those
who descriptively represent their constituents and provide
medium substantive representation are more representative than
those with the same degree of substantive representation mi-
nus descriptive similarity. This dichotomy, then, between sub-
stantive and descriptive that persists in the literature ignores
the hard cases, and lumps them into one or the other. Research
in this area needs to focus on the hard cases, and consider
representation not as an either/or proposition, but as a com-
plex concept that needs to be analyzed using methods that are
attuned to this complexity.
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black, urban, Democratic members from majority Latino dis-
tricts, and so on.
Gerring offers insight into precisely how to create a ty-
pology for social scientific concepts. In his analysis of ideol-
ogy, Gerring notes that typologies are usually created in sev-
eral ways. First, he notes that empirical researchers can ap-
propriate the definition of a classic work on the concept, which
in the case of representation has been Pitkin’s framework.
Secondly, scholars can adopt a “causal-explanatory” under-
standing of the concept, by which he means that a concept
can be described by what explains it. For example, in the case
of representation, one can say that to represent and be repre-
sented is one of the key aspects of democratic systems, and
thus one can only examine representation in terms of how the
represented and the one representing interact. Gerring pro-
poses a schema that focuses on “specific definitional at-
tributes” of the given concept (Gerring 2001). Researchers
should formulate a minimal definition of the concept and an
ideal-type definition, as well.
What Gerring and Ragin have in common is their call for
researchers to be more conscientious about the way they are
using concepts in their research. Gerring calls for a criterial
framework while Ragin calls for employing fuzzy set methods.
Either way, the message is clear: Think carefully about con-
ceptualization and create typologies that accurately repre-
sent the concept being measured.
Case Selection
Once one performs adequate conceptualization and ty-
pology formation, one of the most challenging tasks is to
ensure that cases are chosen carefully. Very little agreement
exists on how to best choose cases.6 As Gerring (2001) points
out, one of the main goals of social science is achieving repre-
sentativeness in a given sample. That is, we should avoid
bias in the cases we choose. With respect to the concept of
representation, then, it is crucial to choose cases that are
representative of the type of representation we are trying to
study. For example, it would be unrepresentative to generalize
about Mexican-American members of Congress by only se-
lecting Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX) for an interview because he
is the only Mexican Republican in Congress and his views are
not representative of many Mexican-Americans.7 Gerring sug-
gests that random samples are always solutions to selection
bias, but in the case of racial representation in Congress, it
would be foolish to pick a random sample of a population of
20 members of Congress.
One of the cardinal sins of social science is selection
bias.8 Selection bias occurs when selection takes place on the
dependent variable, thus biasing conclusions in many in-
stances. Because qualitative research is more susceptible to
selection bias, special attention must be given to methodol-
ogy in order to avoid criticism that is often unjustified. Geddes
argues that many works of valuable comparative politics, such
as Skocpol’s work on social revolutions, have a place in politi-
cal science, but that they do not advance theoretical knowl-
edge. Much in the same way William Riker argued for a more
scientific political science, Geddes (1990) approaches the is
sue of selection bias by framing qualitative research as unsci-
entific and inferior to more rigorous statistical research. Simi-
larly, KKV also discuss the differences between cases and
observations and criticize qualitative researchers for conflating
the two in many instances. KKV prefer to use the term “obser-
vation” because of its precise single-unit connotation.
According to Collier, researchers have not considered
the distinction between plurality of causes and causal hetero-
geneity. Plurality of causes involves an outcome, which is
caused by unrelated variables, while causal heterogeneity in-
volves the property of the data in relation to the model being
tested. Simply adding more cases is not always compelling in
terms of correcting selection bias. Collier points out, however,
that it is not always “sinful” to select on the dependent vari-
able as long as one does so carefully, with full knowledge of
the implications. In many cases, what many deem selection on
the dependent variable is merely counting mistakes, as in the
case of Achen and Snidal’s analysis of deterrence theory.9
With respect to studies of representation, Fenno’s semi-
nal work on members of Congress has formed the basis by
which other studies of representation have proceeded. His
research design involved carefully selecting cases in order to
ensure regional and political representativeness.  He did not
merely interview whomever he had the opportunity to inter-
view and observe. He carefully selected subjects based on
pre-ordained criteria in order to ensure representativeness.
He did not assume that more and more interviews would be
the answer to selection bias. Had he only chosen Democrats,
his study would have been biased based on party affiliation.
In a similar way, he chose African-Americans as well as white
members of Congress in his analysis.
Conclusion
To date, the literature on representation has borrowed from
Pitkin’s framework, which to a large extent has much utility.
However, issues of race, ethnicity, and the surrounding de-
bates on redistricting call for a reconceptualization of repre-
sentation with special attention given to the various ways of
defining the concept, including the typologies used, as well as
careful selection of cases when researching representation.
Does representation involve more than just how legisla-
tors vote? If so, then scholars need to look at other ways of
representation, including bill sponsorships, and the different
manifestations of representativeness. This is not an easy con-
cept to measure. While this paper focused exclusively on con-
ceptualization and, to a small degree, case selection, the chal-
lenge for researchers in this area is to think carefully about
concepts and how to accurately measure them.
Notes
1 This is not the case regarding gender representation. See Celis
(forthcoming) for a thorough review of representation from a women’s
studies perspective.
2 It is outside the scope of this article to fully analyze fuzzy set
methods. Ragin’s work, however, calls attention to the problems
with variable-oriented research.
3 This is not the case in the literature on gender and representation,
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In his Introduction to the symposium on Alexander L.
George and Andrew Bennett’s Case Studies and Theory De-
velopment in the Social Sciences, published in Qualitative
Methods in the spring of 2006, Jack S. Levy predicts that this
book “is likely to be highly influential and widely cited—and
also, quite properly, will serve as a target of criticism” (2006,
34). In this brief note, I shall raise two points of fundamental
criticism not explicitly raised in the contributions to the sym-
posium—although David Dessler touches upon them from a
different angle (2006, 44)—with respect to George and Bennett’s
understanding of causality and causal mechanisms against
the background of David Hume’s classic treatment of causa-
tion in A Treatise of Human Nature.
In chapter 7, which is concerned with case studies and the
philosophy of science, George and Bennett discuss the ap-
proach of explaining phenomena via causal mechanisms, which,
according to them, “has gained a wide following among social
scientists and philosophers of science” (George and Bennett
2004, 135). In that chapter they also pay attention to the close
connection existing between the “epistemology of causal
mechanisms and the methodology of process-tracing” (2004,
129; cf. also Wendt 1999, 82). This close connection derives
from their conviction that explanation by means of causal mecha-
nisms “draws on spatial contiguity and temporal succession”
(2004, 140). Mechanism-based explanations “are committed to
realism and to continuousness and contiguity in causal pro-
cesses” (ibid.). In chapter 10, which deals with process tracing
and historical explanation, they return to this subject. Process
tracing has many advantages for theory development and
theory testing, because it “attempts to identify the intervening
causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—
between an independent variable (or variables) and the out-
come of the dependent variable” (2004, 206). They have to
admit however that “process tracing provides a strong basis
for causal inference only if it can establish an uninterrupted
causal path linking the putative causes to the observed ef-
fects” (2004, 222).
Leaving aside for the moment the question of what they
mean when they speak of causal mechanisms, I wish to point
out that George and Bennett are confronted with a problem
when they suggest that the requirements of “spatial contigu-
ity” and “temporal succession” with respect to causation go
back to David Hume (cf. 2004, 140), because Hume makes very
clear that contiguity and succession are not enough to pro-
duce the idea of causation. In A Treatise of Human Nature,
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where there has been more of an effort to address these important
issues. See Phillips 1998, Young 1997, and Celis (forthcoming) for
explicit treatments of gender and representation.
4 See Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951) for more on the issue of prop-
erty spaces in political science research.
5 At the same time, however, we should be mindful of “the risks of
reification and of relabeling anomalies,” as Elman (2005) warns.
6 Van Evera (1997, 88) offers a list of 11 criteria for case selection,
with a matrix aimed at making criteria for case selection easier for
graduate students writing their dissertations.
7 Please indulge the unfortunate relationship of the concept of
representation with representativeness.
8 See Achen and Snidal (1989), who refer to selection bias as an
“inferential felony with devastating implications.”
9 Collier’s ideas given at IQRM in Tempe, AZ in January 2003.
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